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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE – PLAIN MEANING 
PRECLUDES ORDINARY MEANING 
Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Taylor 
 
In Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Taylor,1 Industrial Contractors, Inc. 
(“ICI”) appealed a judgment from the Burleigh County District Court af-
firming a decision by an independent administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that 
determined Leonard Taylor’s (“Taylor”) employment as an electrician with 
ICI was not “seasonal employment.”2  ICI argued that the ALJ incorrectly 
interpreted North Dakota Century Code § 65-01-02(5)’s use of the term 
“seasonal employment.”3  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the case.4  The Court agreed with ICI that the ALJ misapplied § 
65-01-02(5) and that the ALJ’s decision was not based upon a preponder-
ance of the evidence.5 
ICI provided contract construction services for industrial clients.6  It 
hired employees for projects by sending referral requests to local unions, 
such as the Western North Dakota International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Worker, Local Union 714 (“the Union”).7  ICI and the Union entered into a 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, under which ICI could transfer union 
members between projects.8  According to the Union’s business manager, 
Randy Bartsch, ICI moved employees between projects based on the need 
for workers.9  According to ICI’s safety and risk manager, Tyler Svihovec 
(“Svihovec”), calling union halls for employees was part of ICI’s hiring 
process.10  Svihovec testified that the “vast majority” of employees hired in 
that manner were laid off when the project was completed and was “some-
what atypical” for ICI to transfer an employee to another job.11  
ICI hired Taylor on March 9, 2014, after the Union referred Taylor for 
a job as an electrician.12  However, Taylor and ICI disagreed about the 
length of Taylor’s employment.13  According to Taylor, his referral with ICI 
 
1. 2017 ND 183, 899 N.W.2d 680. 
2. Taylor, ¶ 1, 899 N.W.2d at 681.  
3. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 681-82. 
4. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 682. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. ¶ 2. 
7. Id. 




12. Id. ¶ 3. 
13. Id. 
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was permanent, but ICI stated that it only hired Taylor for the project that 
was scheduled to end May 16, 2014.14  Svihovec stated that ICI hired Tay-
lor to temporarily work at a power plant, which was not a project that cus-
tomarily operated throughout the entire year.15  Two days after being hired, 
Taylor was injured while working at the power plant.16  
After sustaining the injury, Taylor submitted a claim to Workforce 
Safety and Insurance (“WSI”).17  WSI determined that Taylor was a sea-
sonal employee for purposes of North Dakota Century Code § 65-01-
02(5).18  Therefore, WSI accepted liability for Taylor’s injuries.19  WSI 
based its decision on the fact that Taylor’s job as an electrician was subject 
to layoffs and was only temporary due to an estimated completion date of 
May 16, 2014.20  
After WSI’s decision, Taylor requested a formal hearing from an inde-
pendent administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who determined that Taylor’s 
employment was not seasonal, thereby reversing WSI’s decision.21  The 
ALJ based its decision on the fact that electricians hired by ICI worked for 
indefinite periods, meaning that they were “not permanent” employees and 
they were not “seasonal employees” for purposes of § 65-01-02(5).22  The 
ALJ found that ICI employed Taylor to do electrical work at the power 
plant based on a regular referral and Taylor’s employment would last until 
ICI would not need him.23  Subsequently, WSI petitioned for reconsidera-
tion from the ALJ, which the ALJ denied, and the Burleigh County District 
Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.24  ICI, subsequently, appealed the dis-
trict court’s holding.25 
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, ICI and WSI made 
three arguments.26  First, they argued the ALJ misapplied the legal standard 
for seasonal employment and should have determined Taylor’s job was sea-
sonal employment under § 65-01-02(5).27  Second, they argued that the ALJ 
failed to take notice of ICI’s customary practice, admitting that under the 
 




18. Id. ¶ 4. 
19. Id. 
20. Taylor, ¶ 4, 899 N.W.2d at 682. 




25. Id., ¶ 6. 
26. Taylor, ¶ 9, 899 N.W.2d at 683. 
27. Id. 
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collective bargaining agreement ICI could have – although not customary – 
transferred electricians such as Taylor, to other projects.28  Finally, ICI ar-
gued the ALJ’s decision conflicted with similar precedent.29 
The North Dakota Supreme Court summed up the issue as being a 
question of statutory interpretation.30  The Court looked to North Dakota 
Century Code § 65-01-02(27)31 for the legislature’s definition of “seasonal 
employment.”32  Section 65-01-02(27) reads “‘[s]easonal employment’ in-
cludes occupations that are not permanent or that do not customarily oper-
ate throughout the entire year. Seasonal employment is determined by what 
is customary with respect to the employer at the time of injury.”33  To inter-
pret the statutory definition, the Court took a piecemeal approach and 
looked at the first and second sentences separately.34  
Relying on a textual approach, the Court reasoned that the statutory 
definition indicated the legislature’s intent to include occupations that were 
performed during different times of the year.35  The first indication that the 
legislature did not intend to limit the definition of “seasonal employment” 
to one specific time of the year was its use of the phrase “includes.”36  The 
term “includes” enlarged the plain meaning of the statute, making the statu-
tory definition non-exhaustive.37  Therefore, the legislature meant for “sea-
sonal employment” to “include[] occupations that are not permanent or that 
do not customarily operate throughout the entire year.”38  Based on the 
plain meaning of § 65-01-02(27), the Court found the statutory definition to 
be usable, but analyzed the ordinary meaning of “seasonal employment,” 




30. Id. ¶ 10. 
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(28) (2017).  
32. See Taylor, ¶ 12, 899 N.W.2d at 684. 
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(28).  
34. See generally Taylor, ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 684. 
35. Id. ¶ 16, 899 N.W.2d at 685. 
36. Id. ¶ 17. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. (citing In re Estate of Elken, 2007 ND 107, ¶ 8, 735 N.W.2d 842; Amerada Hess 
Corp. v. State, 2005 ND 155, ¶ 13, 704 N.W.2d 8; Hilton v. N.D. Educ. Ass’n, 2002 ND 209, ¶ 
12, 655 N.W.2d 60; Matter of Estate of Leier, 524 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D. 1994); Americana 
Healthcare Ctr. v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Serv., 510 N.W.2d 592, 594 (N.D. 1994); State v. Vermi-
lya, 423 N.W.2d 153, 154-55 (N.D. 1988); Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 234 (N.D. 1980); 
see also NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 91 (2017) (“[a]n exhaustive defini-
tion uses the word means while a partial listing uses the word includes[;] … ‘[i]ncludes’ is not a 
term of limitation”) (emphasis added). 
39. Id. 
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Also within the first sentence of § 65-01-02(27), the Court pointed out 
the statutory definition’s use of the term “or.”40  The word “or” is nestled 
between two conditions of employment that indicate that it is seasonal.41  
The two explicit conditions for “seasonal employment” are that the em-
ployment: (1) is not permanent or (2) does not customarily operate 
throughout the year.42  Therefore, the first alternative demonstrates non-
permanent employment, and the second alternative demonstrates the limita-
tions on the time of year.43  
The Court then turned to the second sentence of § 65-01-02(27), which 
stated, “[s]easonal employment is determined by what is customary with 
respect to the employer at the time of injury.”44  The Court relied on several 
facts surrounding Taylor’s employment to determine whether the second 
sentence of the statutory definition had been satisfied.45  The Court relied 
on the fact that the ALJ found that “generally” ICI’s management decides 
the manpower that will be needed at each project, which union halls will be 
contacted to find referrals, which referrals to hire for which projects, and 
the expected duration of the project.46  Svihovec stated that “most of” ICI’s 
electricians are hired in the spring and fall during the power plant project 
and that “all” electricians are hired for specific projects and then laid off.47  
The Court recognized that Svihovec’s testimony established ICI’s custom, 
thereby satisfying § 65-01-02(27)’s definition of “seasonal employment” 
under the second sentence of the statute.48  The record established that ICI 
hired 719 electricians from 2010 to 2015.49  Out of the 719, only 9 were 
transferred to another project.50  The Court found that 9 out of 719 was too 
low of a number to establish that transferring electricians was the custom 
for ICI as required by § 65-01-02(27).51  
Even though the text of § 65-01-02(27) was able to provide a complete 
answer for the North Dakota Supreme Court to resolve the issue, the Court 
then looked to the ordinary meaning of “seasonal employment” as a formal-
 
40. Taylor, ¶ 18, 899 N.W.2d at 685-86. 
41. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 686. 
42. Id. (emphasis added). 
43. Id. ¶ 19. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Taylor, ¶ 26, 899 N.W.2d at 687. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. ¶ 27. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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ity.52  The ordinary meaning (as opposed to the plain meaning) of “seasonal 
employment” required the occupation to be carried out only during a certain 
time of the year.53  The Court found the ordinary meaning of the adjective 
“seasonal” in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary,54 and found that 
“seasonal” relates to the seasons of the year.55  Using the same dictionary, 
the Court found that the ordinary meaning of “employment” was “the state 
of being employed or occupation by which a person earns a living.”56  
However, the Court found an ambiguity with the word “occupation,” but 
again using the same dictionary, found that the ordinary meaning of “occu-
pation” was “the usual or principal business of one’s life, especially as a 
means of earning a living, or a vocation.”57  Finally, the majority looked to 
Black’s Law Dictionary,58 and found that another meaning of “seasonal 
employment” was “[a]n occupation possible only during limited parts of the 
year, such as a summer-camp counselor, a baseball-park vendor, or a shop-
ping-mall Santa.”59 
As the North Dakota Supreme Court did with § 65-01-02(27), it found 
that the meaning within the two dictionaries was plain and found that “the 
meaning of ‘seasonal employment’ in workers’ compensation laws general-
ly refers to occupations carried on only during certain seasons or portions of 
the year and does not include occupations that can be carried on throughout 
the entire year.”60  The Court then reassured its finding with the fact that 
other jurisdictions have used the same ordinary meaning when applied to 
various occupations.61  
 
52. Taylor, ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 684. 
53. Id. ¶ 14, 899 N.W.2d at 685. 
54. 1120 (11th ed. 2005). 
55. Taylor, ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 684. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. 605 (9th ed. 2009). 
59. Taylor, ¶ 13 899 N.W.2d at 684-85. 
60. Id. ¶ 14, 899 N.W.2d at 685 (citing Annot., What is “Seasonal” Employment Within Pro-
visions of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 93 ALR 308 (1934)). 
61. Id. ¶ 15. For example, Arizona courts have stated that “seasonal employment” means oc-
cupations that are engaged in only during certain times of the year, unlike timber cutting, see Pet-
tis v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 372 P.2d 72, 74-75 (Ariz. 1962), or ballet dancing, see Wozniak v. 
Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 359 P.3d 1014, 1018-20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015). Minnesota courts have 
similarly held that “seasonal employment” means occupations that do not customarily operate 
throughout the year because of their inherent nature or the local climate, unlike employment at a 
part-time moving company, see Rogers v. Cedar Van Lines, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 669, 671-72 (Minn. 
1979), but the case was remanded for turkey production employees, see In re Application of Land 
O’ Lakes Creameries, Inc., 68 N.W.2d 256, 259-61 (Minn. 1955).  The majority also looked to 
other jurisdictions which held that coal delivery is not seasonal employment, Hogsett v. Cinek 
Coal & Feed Co., 255 N.W. 546, 547-48 (Neb. 1934), logging is not seasonal employment, Muril-
lo v. Payroll Express, 901 P.2d 751, 759-60 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), dishwashing is not seasonal 
employment, Froehly v. T.M. Harton Co., 139 A. 727, 729-30 (Pa. 1927), running for a judgeship 
            
2018] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 183 
Based on North Dakota Supreme Court’s textual interpretation of § 65-
01-02(27), the Court held that the ALJ failed to apply the plain meaning of 
§ 65-01-02(5) to ICI’s employment of electricians.62  The Court also rea-
soned the ALJ’s interpretation of the statute did not give effect to every 
word in the legislature’s statutory definition.63  Accordingly, the Court 
found that WSI had applied the statute correctly when it determined Tay-
lor’s employment was “seasonal employment.”64 
Even though deference is shown to an agency’s statutory interpretation, 
there was no such deference for the ALJ’s legal conclusions.65  In deciding 
that Taylor was not a seasonal employee, the ALJ relied on the referral re-
quest form statement that a position for fourteen or less days was tempo-
rary.66  This statement was viewed as dispositive by the ALJ, whereas the 
request form used “regular” employees for other positions.67  The Court 
recognized that a time limitation was not imposed by § 65-01-02(5), Taylor 
was a regular employee, but not a permanent employee, and was scheduled 
to work until May 16, 2014.68 
Because the ALJ’s determination that Taylor’s employment was not 
seasonal, the determination did not comply with either the first or second 
sentences of § 65-01-02(27), the Court reversed the ALJ’s decision and re-
manded the case back to WSI to calculate Taylor’s disability benefits under 
North Dakota Century Code § 65-01-02(5) and WSI’s original order.69 
However, the dissent by Justice Crothers came to exact opposite con-
clusions that the majority came to – simply, that the ALJ did not misapply 
the law and the ALJ’s decision was supported by a preponderance of the ev-
idence.70  The dissent reasoned that the ALJ’s interpretation of “seasonal 
employment” was consistent with both the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the phrase within § 65-01-02(27) as applied to the occupation of an electri-
cian, based on the fact that ICI employed electricians regardless of the time 
of year.71 
 
was not dependent on the particular season, Nilson v. Clay City., 534 N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (S.D. 
1995), and threshing is seasonal employment and thus not continuous throughout the year, Meyer 
v. Roettele, 264 N.W. 191, 195 (S.D. 1935). 
62. Id. ¶ 20, 899 N.W.2d at 686. 
63. Id. 
64. Id., ¶ 21. 
65. Taylor, ¶ 23, 899 N.W.2d at 686 (citing In re Juran and Moody, Inc., 2000 ND 136, ¶¶ 
25-27, 613 N.W.2d 503). 
66. Id. ¶ 25. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. ¶ 28, 899 N.W.2d at 687. 
70. Id., ¶ 30 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
71. Taylor, ¶ 38, 899 N.W.2d at 690 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
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The dissent agreed with the majority that “[t]his case boil[ed] down to 
whether the ALJ erred in finding Taylor’s employment was ‘seasonal’” un-
der North Dakota Century Code § 65-01-02(5) and looked to North Dakota 
Century Code § 65-01-02(27) for the legislature’s definition of “seasonal 
employment.”72  However, where the majority took a piecemeal approach, 
73 the dissent interpreted the statutory definition as a whole, concluding that 
“seasonal employment includes occupations that are not permanent and is 
determined by what is customary with respect to the employer’s undertak-
ing with that occupation at the time of the injury, as opposed to the employ-
er’s relationship with a particular individual.”74 
The dissent agreed with the majority that the term “includes” enlarged 
the plain meaning of the statute, and the statutory definition was not ex-
haustive.75  Therefore, “seasonal employment” includes occupations that 
are temporary or that are not customarily performed throughout the entire 
year.76  The dissent also agreed that the plain meaning was usable, but that 
plain meaning was not enough, because the non-exhaustive nature of the 
statute allows for judicial interpretation; therefore, the Court was free to add 
additional conditions that indicated a job was seasonal.77  Regarding the 
majority’s decision to interpret the two sentences of § 65-01-02(27) sepa-
rately, the dissent read the two sentences of § 65-01-02(27) together and 
framed the issue as “whether the employment is ‘seasonal,’ and . . . custom-
ary for the employer regarding that particular occupation and not the partic-
ular employee.”78  
In regards to the second sentence of § 65-01-02(27), the dissent agreed 
with the majority by relying on the fact that the ALJ found that “generally” 
ICI’s management decides the manpower, which union halls to contact, 
which referrals to hire, and the project’s duration.79  However, the dissent 
went further by also relying on the fact that change orders were often is-
 
72. See id., ¶ 31, 899 N.W.2d at 687 (Crothers, J. dissenting) (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 
65-01-02(28) (2010)). 
73. See generally id. ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 684.  
74. Id. ¶ 32, 899 N.W.2d at 687 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
75. Id. ¶ 33, 899 N.W.2d at 688 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
76. Id. ¶ 17, 899 N.W.2d at 685 (citing In re Estate of Elken, 2007 ND 107, ¶ 8, 735 N.W.2d 
842; Amerada Hess Corp. v. State, 2005 ND 155, ¶ 13, 704 N.W.2d 8; Hilton v. N.D. Educ. 
Ass’n, 2002 ND 209, ¶ 12, 655 N.W.2d 60; Matter of Estate of Leier, 524 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D. 
1994); Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Serv., 510 N.W.2d 592, 594 (N.D. 
1994); State v. Vermilya, 423 N.W.2d 153, 154-55 (N.D. 1988); Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 
231, 234 (N.D. 1980); see also NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 91 (2017) 
(“[a]n exhaustive definition uses the word means while a partial listing uses the word includes[;] 
… ‘[i]ncludes’ is not a term of limitation”) (emphasis added). 
77. Taylor, ¶ 33, 899 N.W.2d at 688 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
78. Id. ¶ 36, 899 N.W.2d at 689 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
79. Id. ¶ 37. 
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sued, which created additional work and extended employment.80  Lastly, 
the dissent relied on the fact that this evidence was not provided to WSI.81  
 The dissent also had differing views regarding Svihovec’s statement 
that “most of” ICI’s electricians are hired in the spring and fall during the 
power plant project and that “all” electricians are hired for specific projects 
and then laid off.82  Unlike the majority who focused on the second sen-
tence in isolation, the dissent focused on the fact that ICI hired electricians 
throughout the year, and that electricians were employed during every 
month of the year in one way or another.83  The dissent also relied on ICI 
records that indicated electricians stayed “year round, year after year, 
through the transfer process.”84  The dissent also noted that ICI was able to 
hire and utilize electricians during any season of the year.85  Lastly, the dis-
sent relied on the fact that this evidence was not provided to WSI.86 
The dissent also diverged from the majority in regards to the record 
which established that out of the 719 electricians that were hired by ICI, on-
ly 9 were transferred to another project.87  Unlike the majority who found 
that only nine electricians were transferred, the dissent read the evidence 
differently, instead of 9 people being transferred, it found that “multiple” 
people were transferred and the documents cited to 9 transfer incidences as 
merely an example of the number of employees transferred, rather than as 
an exhaustive list that the majority presumptively understood.88  The dissent 
relied on the fact that this evidence was provided to the ALJ, but was not 
provided to WSI.89  The dissent determined that the weight of the evidence 
supported the ALJ’s finding that ICI’s electricians generally operated 
throughout the year, regardless of the season.90 
Even though the text of § 65-01-02(27) was able to provide a complete 
answer for the North Dakota Supreme Court to resolve the issue, the dissent 
looked at the ordinary meaning as a second required step in the analysis, 
unlike the majority who looked to the ordinary meaning as a mere formali-




82. Id. ¶ 26, 899 N.W.2d at 687. 
83. Taylor, ¶ 37, 899 N.W.2d at 689 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
84. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 690 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
85. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 689 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. ¶ 27, 899 N.W.2d at 687. 
88. Id. ¶ 37, 899 N.W.2d at 689 (Crothers, J. dissenting) (“See, e.g. Ex. 38, Employee Nos. 
61713, 61006, 61038, 61714, 61847, 61257, 61054, 61067 and 61026.”). 
89. Taylor, ¶ 37, 899 N.W.2d at 890 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 684. 
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“seasonal employment” required the occupation to be carried out only dur-
ing a certain time of the year.92  But where the majority looked to dictionar-
ies, the dissent relied on a treatise on the issue that stated “the inherent sea-
sonal nature of the employment that controls, not the claimant’s seasonal 
connection with it.”93  The dissent also relied on Froehly v. T.M. Harton 
Co.,94 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held dishwashing was not 
seasonal employment even though the position was at a summer amusement 
park.95  Interestingly, even though the dissent was not satisfied with the 
plain meaning of the North Dakota legislature’s definition of “seasonal em-
ployment,” it seemingly had no reservations about relying on the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court’s extrinsic definition.96  In Froehly, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court looked to the Century Dictionary to determine that the word 
“seasonal”: 
 
[I]s formed from the substantive “season,” plus the adjective suffix 
“al,” meaning “of the kind of” and “pertaining to,” thus making 
“season,” a word pertaining to a season or a specific part of a year; 
hence it may be said that a seasonal occupation is an employment 
pertaining to, or of that kind of, labor exclusively performed at 
specific seasons or periods of the year.97 
 
In Froehly, the court went on to differentiate the words “causal” and 
“intermittent” from “seasonal” by referencing that the first two words are 
similar in that they can be done at any time of the year, but “seasonal” is re-
liant upon the very season of the year in which that occupation can be per-
formed.98  The Froehly court further stressed that seasonal occupations are 
contrasted with occupations that can be carried out at any time of the year, 
such as dishwashing.99 The court stated:  
 
[Dishwashing] may be, as in the present case, carried on at a sum-
mer resort for merely three months in the year . . . Appellant here 
confuses the character of work . . . performed by claimant, with the 
 
92. Id. ¶ 36, 899 N.W.2d at 689 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
93. Id. ¶ 35, 899 N.W.2d at 688 (Crothers, J. dissenting) (citing 8 Larson’s Workers’ Com-
pensation Law § 93.02[3][b]). 
94. Froehly v. T.M. Harton Co., 139 A. 727, 729-30 (Pa. 1927). 
95. Taylor, ¶ 35, 899 N.W.2d at 688 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
96. Id. 
97. T.M. Harton Co., 139 A. at 729 (Pa. 1927). 
98. Id. at 730. 
99. Id. 
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seasonal period during which the amusement park remained open 
to the public.”100 
 
Therefore, Justice Crothers’ dissent would have affirmed the ALJ’s 
judgment.101  The dissent found that the ALJ did not misinterpret § 65-01-
02(27), and thus, did not misapply § 65-01-02(5) to the facts surrounding 
Taylor’s employment as an electrician.102  In part, based on the facts that 
ICI’s employment of electricians was not customarily dependent on the sea-
son of the year.103 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS – CITY’S 
MISSTATED SCOPE OF DISTRICT IMPROVEMENTS IN A 
NOTICE TO LANDOWNERS DOES NOT VIOLATE 
LANDOWNER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
Paving District v. City of Minot 
 
In Paving District v. City of Minot,104 Appellant landowners sued the 
City of Minot (“City”).105  The landowners claimed that the City gave them 
improper notice for improvements in a paving district, and thus, the City’s 
assessments to the landowners’ properties for proposed street improvements 
were invalid.106  The Ward County District Court granted summary judge-
ment in favor of the City and dismissed the landowners’ complaint.107  Ad-
ditionally, the district court concluded that the landowners were barred from 
bringing the action because they failed to appeal or commence the action 
within the thirty-day time limit under N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43.108  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that § 40-22-43 is a statute of re-
pose.109  The Court reasoned the statute of repose meant that the thirty-day 
time limit began to run when city council adopted its resolution awarding 
sale of warrants to finance the improvements.110  Thus, the Court held the 
 
100. Id. 
101. Taylor, ¶ 38, 899 N.W.2d at 690 (Crothers, J. dissenting). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. 2017 ND 176, 898 N.W.2d 418. 
105. Paving District, ¶ 8, 898 N.W.2d at 421. 
106. Id. ¶ 1, 898 N.W.2d at 422. 
107. Id. ¶ 10. 
108. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-22-43 (2017). 
109. Id. ¶ 15, 898 N.W.2d at 423.; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (7th ed. 1999) (defining 
a statute of repose as a “statute that bars a suit a fixed number of years after the defendant acts in 
some way . . . even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered any injury). 
110. Id. ¶ 16. 
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thirty-day time limit under N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43 precluded the landowners’ 
claim.111  Further, the Court held that the landowners failed to establish that 
the assessment proceedings violated the Due Process Clause or any other 
constitutional limitation.112  
The landowners made three arguments on appeal.113 First, the land-
owners argued that the City violated the statutory notice requirement of 
N.D.C.C. § 40-22-15.114  Second, the landowners argued that the city vio-
lated the Due Process Clause because defects in their notice resulted in the 
City’s failure to provide substantial and correct notice as required under the 
United States Constitution.115  Third, the landowners argued that the thirty-
day time limit of N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43, did not apply because the proceed-
ings violated the North Dakota Constitution’s Gift Clause Provision.116  Ul-
timately, on July 12, 2017, the North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with 
all three of the landowners’ arguments.117  The Court held that the City did 
not violate any constitutional limitation or restriction, the landowners’ 
claim was barred by the thirty-day time limit, and the proceedings did not 
violate North Dakota’s Constitution’s Gift Clause.118  
On October 1, 2012, the City Council of Minot approved Resolution 
No. 3109, which declared the necessary improvement of Paving District 
No. 476.119  The resolution provided which landowners would be specially 
assessed for the improvements to the district and that those landowners 
would have thirty days to file written protests.120  The resolution further ex-
plained that if a landowner chose to file a written protest within thirty days, 
the city would hold a hearing to hear protests.121  A few days after the City 
approved the resolution, on October 5, 2012, the City sent letters to proper-
ty owners about the creation of the paving district and the proposed street 
improvements.122  The letters explained the improvements as follows, “an 
urban street section from 2nd St to 10th St consisting of storm sewer, curb 
and gutter, asphalt paving, and street lighting.”123  Additionally, the letters 
 
111. Paving District, ¶ 16, 898 N.W.2d at 423. 
112. Id. ¶ 27, 898 N.W.2d at 426. 
113. Id. ¶ 12, 898 N.W.2d at 422. (The landowners included: Paving District 476 Group, 
SPCM LLC; Hudye Group LP; and Northern Plains Apartments LLC.) 
114. Id. 
115. Id.  
116. Id. 
117. Paving District, ¶ 27, 898 N.W.2d at 426. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. ¶ 4, 898 N.W.2d at 421. (The Paving District is located on 36th Avenue Northeast.) 
120. Id. 
121. Id.  
122. Id.  
123. Paving District, ¶ 4, 898 N.W.2d at 421.  
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explained that the City would attribute the costs for the project to each 
property owner proportionately, and the costs would not exceed the benefits 
the property owners would get from the improvements.124  The letter ad-
vised the property owners that they had thirty days to protest the improve-
ments and that a public hearing would be held on December 3, 2012.125  Af-
ter the December 3, 2012 public hearing, the City Council adopted 
Resolution 3250 on November 4, 2013, awarding the sale of warrants to fi-
nance the improvements.126  
On June 7, 2015, the Minot Daily News published a “Notice of Costs, 
Benefits, Assessments and Date of Public Hearing for the Paving Dis-
trict.”127  Included in this notice were maps of the special assessment dis-
trict and the amount of the proposed assessment for each property.128  Sev-
eral property owners attended and raised concerns at a July 6, 2015, 
meeting.129  The property owners expressed concern about a change in the 
scope of the area being improved and about paying for improvements to 
properties outside city limits.130  The city engineer explained that the dis-
trict was created and always “indicated it was going to 13th Street Northeast, 
but a mistake was made when notices were sent out stating improvements 
went to 10th Street Northeast.”131  Because of this mistake, the city engineer 
explained that the scope of the project did not increase.132  In fact, the cost 
estimates in the notices included improvements to 13th Street Northeast.133  
As a result, notices were not sent again with the corrected information be-
cause the costs remained the same.134  Ultimately, at this meeting, the City 
Council approved the special assessment commission report for the paving 
district.135  
Nearly two years after the City awarded the sale of warrants to finance 
the improvements, on October 28, 2015, the landowners sued the City, 
seeking a judgment declaring the assessments invalid.136  Further, the land-




126. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. 
127. Id. ¶ 6, 898 N.W.2d at 421.  
128. Id. 
129. Paving District, ¶ 7, 898 N.W.2d at 421. 
130. Id. 
131. Id.  
132. Id.  
133. Id.  
134. Id. 
135. Paving District, ¶ 7, 898 N.W.2d at 421.  
136. Id. ¶ 8. 
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abeyance137 until [the City] did not include the area between 10th and 13th 
Street.”138  The landowners further sought the district court’s enjoinment of 
the City from certifying future assessments.139  Lastly, the landowners 
claimed that the invalid notice amounted to a violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution.140  In response, the City moved to 
dismiss the complaint and argued that the landowners failed to meet juris-
dictional time limitations under N.D.C.C. §§ 40-22-43, 40-26-01, and 28-
34-01.141  The City further argued that the landowner’s constitutional claims 
were barred by Serenko v. City of Wilton.142  In favor of the City, the district 
court granted summary judgement and dismissed the complaint.143  The dis-
trict court reasoned that the landowners could not sue the City because the 
thirty-day time limit under N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43 had passed.144  The land-
owners appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.145 The Supreme 
Court addressed all three of the landowner’s arguments in turn.146 
First, the Court addressed the landowners’ argument that the City vio-
lated the statutory notice requirement of N.D.C.C. § 40-22-15.147  Section 
40-22-15 partly provides, “[t]he resolution must refer intelligibly to the en-
gineer’s report and include a map of the municipality showing the proposed 
improvement districts.”148  The landowners argued that the City’s mistake 
in the notice regarding the extent of the proposed improvement violated § 
40-22-15.149  The Court held that the action was barred by N.D.C.C. § 40-
22-43’s thirty-day time limit.150  Section 40-22-43 provides, “no action 
shall be commenced . . . in the courts of this state . . . unless commenced 
within thirty days of the adoption of the resolution of the governing board 
awarding the sale of warrants to finance the improvement.”151  The Court 
explained that § 40-22-43 is a statute of repose for actions based on defects 
and irregularities in proceedings under N.D.C.C. § 40-22, which governs 
 
137. Merriam-Webster defines “in abeyance” as “a state of temporary inactivity – suspen-
sion.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abeyance.   
138. Paving District, ¶ 8, 898 N.W.2d at 421. 
139. Id.  
140. Id.; U.S. CONT. amd. XIV (2017).   
141. Paving District, ¶ 9, 898 N.W.2d at 422. 
142. Id., Serenko v. City of Wilton, 1999 ND 88, 593 N.W.2d 368 (holding there is no con-
stitutional right to notice when a city initially decides to construct an improvement). 
143. Paving District, ¶ 10, 898 N.W.2d at 422.  
144. Id.  
145. Id. 
146. Id. ¶ 12. 
147. Id. ¶ 13. 
148. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-22-43 (2017). 
149. Paving District, ¶ 13, 898 N.W.2d at 423. 
150. Id. ¶ 16.  
151. Id. ¶ 15.  
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the creation of the improvement district.152  The court reasoned that the 
landowners’ complaint involved the creation of an improvement district be-
cause they sought to invalidate the assessments, due to the City’s failure to 
comply with the notice requirements under N.D.C.C. § 40-22-15.153  Addi-
tionally, the Court explained that the thirty-day time limit began when the 
City adopted the resolution.154  Thus, the Court held that since the time lim-
it began when the City adopted the resolution, the landowners’ complaint 
came too late and was barred by the thirty-day time limit.155  Since the 
landowners’ claim was refuted by the time limit, the Court did not evaluate 
whether the mistake violated the notice requirement of § 40-22-15.156  
Second, the Court addressed the landowners’ argument that the City 
violated the Due Process Clause because defects in their notice resulted in 
the City’s failure to provide substantial and correct notice as required under 
the U.S. Constitution.157  The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, states that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”158  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court case, Serenko v. City of Wilton, interpreted N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43 and 
addressed a claim that a defect in a notice of the creation of an assessment 
district constituted a violation of constitutional due process rights.159  In Se-
renko, the Court found no due process violation and that such action was 
barred by the thirty-day time limit under § 40-22-43.160  The Court held that 
there is no constitutional right to notice when a city initially decides to con-
struct an improvement, but there still must be notice and an opportunity to 
be heard at some point before the individual assessment becomes final.161  
The Court explained that § 40-22-15 provides more for landowners in terms 
of notice than the United States Constitution’s notice requirements.162  
Thus, the Court came to three conclusions.163  First, the Court held that § 
40-22-15 provides only a statutory right to notice of the resolution.164  Se-
cond, the Court held that a violation of the statutory right to notice did not 
 
152. Id. 
153. Id.  
154. Id.  
155. Paving District, ¶ 16, 898 N.W.2d at 423. 
156. Id. ¶ 14. 
157. Id. ¶ 17. 
158. Id. ¶ 18, 898 N.W.2d at 423-424; N.D. CONST. art. I Sec. 12 (stating, “No person shall 
. . . be deprived of life, liberty of property without due process of law.”). 
159. Paving District, ¶ 19, 898 N.W.2d at 424.  
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id.  
163. Id.  
164. Id.  
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give rise to a due process violation.165  Last, the Court held that the action 
was barred by the thirty-day time limit.166 
In applying Serenko to this case, the Court came to three conclu-
sions.167 First, there is no constitutional right to notice when a municipality 
initially decides to construct an improvement.168  Second, the creation of an 
improvement district and the making of the improvement alone does not 
deprive an individual of personal or property rights.169  Third, even though 
state law provides it, the landowners do not have a constitutional right to 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.170  Ultimately, the Court held that if 
there was a violation, it was statutory in nature and thus, there was no con-
stitutional violation.171  
Third, the Court addressed the landowners’ argument that the thirty-
day time limit of N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43 did not apply because the proceed-
ings violated the North Dakota Constitution’s Gift Clause Provision.172  The 
landowners argued that the City improperly gifted some of the property 
owners because they received a benefit of the improvement and were not 
required to pay any assessment.173  The Gift Clause is found in article X, 
section 18 of the North Dakota Constitution and states, “[N]either the state 
nor any political subdivision thereof shall otherwise loan or give its credit 
or make donations to or in aid of any individuals, association or corporation 
. . . .”174  In applying the principles of statutory construction to interpret the 
meaning of the Gift Clause, the Court held that the paving district was for a 
public purpose, and thus, the City did not violate the Gift Clause.175  The 
Court explained that the plain language of the provision “explicitly allows a 
city to make internal improvements.”176  Internal improvements include 
projects on public road and highways.177  Furthermore, the provisional re-
striction of loans, credits, and donations “does not apply to legislation for 
the making of internal improvements.”178  Since the paving project related 
to public improvement, the Court held that “the gift clause simply does not 
 
165. Paving District, ¶ 19, 898 N.W.2d at 424.  
166. Id.  
167. Id. ¶ 21.  
168. Id., 898 N.W.2d at 425. 
169. Id.  
170. Id.  
171. Paving District, ¶ 21, 898 N.W.2d at 425.  
172. Id. ¶ 22.  
173. Id. 
174. Id. ¶ 23.  
175. Id. ¶ 25. 
176. Id.   
177. Paving District, ¶ 25, 898 N.W.2d at 425.  
178. Id.; Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 253-54 (N.D. 1960). 
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encompass such claims.”179 Thereafter, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the District Court, holding that the assessment proceedings did not 
violate the Due Process Clause and the landowners’ action was barred by § 
40-22-15’s thirty-day time limit.180  
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred181 in the judgement, expressing 
concern with the error in the notice and the fact that the City did not 
acknowledge the error until much later than the thirty-day time limit im-
posed on the landowners by § 40-22-43.182  In explaining that his concern 
was not enough to provide a remedy for the landowners, Chief Justice 
VandeWalle provided clarification as to what the Court meant by classify-
ing § 40-22-43 as a statute of repose.183  Chief Justice VandeWalle ex-
plained that a statute of repose is designed to “bar[] a suit a fixed number of 
years after the defendant acts in some way . . . even if this period ends be-
fore the plaintiff has suffered any injury.”184  Thus, since § 40-22-43 is a 
statute of repose, the landowners were barred from bringing this claim be-
fore they became aware of the mistake in the City’s notice. Furthermore, 
Chief Justice VandeWalle compared a statute of repose with a statute of 
limitation by explaining that, “If § 40-22-43 were a statute of limitation, the 
time for bringing an action to contest the proceeding might be held to run 
from the time the [landowners] were notified or otherwise discovered the 
error in the notice.”185  Thus, with § 40-22-43 the legislature barred the 
landowners from a remedy before they knew they needed a remedy.186  Ul-
timately, the Court could not impose a remedy for such error because the 
authority lies with the legislature.187  
CRIMINAL LAW – RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 
State v. Gibson 
 
In State v. Gibson,188 Steven Gibson (“Gibson”) appealed from a crim-
inal judgment entered upon his conditional guilty plea after the district court 
 
179. Paving District, ¶ 25, 898 N.W.2d at 425. 
180. Id. ¶ 27, 898 N.W.2d at 426. 
181. Justice Crothers joined Chief Justice VandeWalle’s concurrence.  
182. Paving District, ¶ 30, 898 N.W.2d at 426.  
183. Id. 
184. Id.; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (7th ed. 1999). 
185. Paving District, ¶ 30. 898 N.W.2d at 426; see Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 
(N.D. 1968). 
186. Paving District, ¶ 30, 885 N.W.2d at 426. 
187. Id.  
188. 2017 ND 15, 889 N.W.2d 852. 
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rejected his claim that the State violated his right to a speedy trial.189  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court held that under North Dakota Century Code § 
29-19-02, the ninety-day period for a speedy trial begins when the district 
court and the state’s attorney receive the request for a speedy trial.190  The 
Court also held that the eleven-day delay by the North Dakota Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“the DOC”) in sending the request was 
not sufficient to indicate a violation of Gibson’s right to a speedy trail.191 
On October 2, 2015, Gibson submitted the request for a speedy trial to 
the DOC.192  On October 13, 2015, the Department mailed the request to 
the South Central Judicial District Court, Burleigh County, and the Burleigh 
County State’s Attorney.193  The district court received the request on Oc-
tober 15, 2015, thirteen days after Gibson submitted his request.  The state’s 
attorney received the request on October 16, 2015, fourteen days after the 
request was submitted to the DOC.  Gibson’s trial was set for January 6, 
2016, which was ninety-six days after Gibson submitted his request and 
eighty-two days after the district court and state’s attorney received the re-
quest.194  Gibson argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated and 
moved to dismiss the charges.195 
The issue of the case came down to the meaning of the term “elects” in 
North Dakota Century Code § 29-19-02.196  The statute demands that “the 
trial to begin within ninety days of the date the party elects this right.”197  
Gibson argued that he elected his right when he submitted the request to the 
DOC.198  Specifically he argued that the district court should have sched-
uled his trial within ninety days of his request submission to the DOC, not 
within ninety days of the district court and state’s attorney receiving the re-
quest.199  The State argued, however, that Gibson elected his right when the 
district court and the state’s attorney’s office received the request.200  
Agreeing with the State, the Court held that the defendant elected his 
right to a speedy trial when the district court and the state’s attorney re-
 
189. Gibson, ¶ 1, 889 N.W.2d at 852-53.  
190. Id., 889 N.W.2d at 853. 
191. Id. ¶ 7, 889 N.W.2d at 854. 
192. Id. ¶ 3. 
193. Gibson, ¶ 3, 889 N.W.2d at 853. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. ¶ 4. 
196. Id. 
197. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-19-02 (2017). 
198. Gibson, ¶ 4, 889 N.W.2d at 853. 
199. Id. ¶ 5. 
200. Id. 
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ceived the party’s request.201  Accordingly, the Court found that the state 
did not violate Gibson’s right to a speedy trial.202  Because there was no 
clear guidance on the issue from either the North Dakota Legislature or 
North Dakota Supreme Court precedence, the Court’s reasoning was based 
on common law outside of the statute.203  The two cases the Court looked to 
for guidance were State v. Ripley204 and State v. Moe.205  
Ripley was a question of interpretation regarding the Uniform Manda-
tory Disposition of Detainers Act (“the Detainers Act”), specifically § 29-
33-03 of the North Dakota Century Code.206  Similar to the statute at issue 
in Gibson, the statute in Ripley contained an ambiguous ninety-day provi-
sion.207  The Court in Ripley found that “[t]he clear purpose of the Detainers 
Act is to require prompt disposition of criminal charges against inmates.”208  
The Court also recognized the purpose of uniformity general to all uniform 
statutes.209 Accordingly, the Court looked to Colorado,210 Kansas,211 and 
Missouri212 for guidance.213  Based on the other jurisdictions interpretation 
of the Detainers Act, the Court in Ripley held that the ninety-day provision 
began to run when the district court and the state’s attorney received the re-
quest.214 
In Moe, the applicable statute was the Interstate Agreement on Detain-
ers (“the IAD”), codified under § 29-34-01 of the North Dakota Century 
Code.215 The defendant was incarcerated in Colorado, but was charged with 
a crime in North Dakota, for an unrelated incident.216  The defendant re-
quested a speedy disposition on his detainer which was an ambiguous 180-
day provision.217  The officials in Colorado failed to send the request to the 
North Dakota officials or the North Dakota State’s Attorney.218  The Court 




203. Id., 889 N.W.2d at 853-54. 
204. State v. Ripley, 548 N.W.2d 24 (N.D. 1996).  
205. State v. Moe, 1998 ND 137, 581 N.W.2d 468. 
206. Ripley, 548 N.W.2d at 26. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id.  
210. People v. Lopez, 587 P.2d 792, 795 (1978). 
211. Pierson v. State, 502 P.2d 721, 726 (1972). 
212. State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W.2d 353, 360 (Mo. 1982). 
213. Ripley, 548 N.W.2d at 26. 
214. Id. at 27. 
215. Moe, ¶ 3, 581 N.W.2d at 470. 
216. Id. ¶ 1, 581 N.W.2d at 469-70. 
217. Id. ¶ 15, 581 N.W.2d at 472. 
218. Id. ¶ 4, 581 N.W.2d at 470. 
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IAD which stated that the IAD’s 180-day provision begins to run when “the 
request is actually delivered to officials of the state where charges are pend-
ing.”219  The Court in Moe subsequently held that because the North Dakota 
officials never received the request, the 180 days provision never began to 
run.220 
In the present case, Gibson also argued that his charges should be dis-
missed because North Dakota Century Code § 29-33-02 requires the DOC 
to “forthwith”221 a detainee’s request for disposition of pending charges to 
the district court and state’s attorney.222  The Court drew attention to the 
ambiguity with the term “forthwith” in the statute. However, the Court 
found that of the fourteen days between the DOC receiving the request from 
Gibson and the prosecutor receiving the request from the DOC, eleven of 
those days were caused by delays within the DOC and three of those days 
were time the request spent traveling through the mail.223  Gibson asked the 
Court to consider this statute, together with his request for a speedy trial, 
and find that the submission of the request to the DOC was intended by the 
legislature to indicate that receipt by the DOC was meant to begin the nine-
ty-day countdown.224  The Court disagreed with Gibson and refused to hold 
that they referred to the same right to a speedy trial.225  However, the Court 
did hold that the fourteen day period was “prompt” and did not alter the 
start of the ninety days to which the State and Gibson were entitled.226 
In addition, Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a special concurrence.227  
He wanted to point out the importance of the DOC to forward mail “forth-
with.”228  Chief Justice VandeWalle pointed out that the DOC has a duty, as 
a part of the state under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Consti-
 
219. Id. ¶ 16, 581 N.W.2d at 472. 
220. Id. ¶ 17. 
221. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-33-02 (2017) states that:  
The request must be delivered to the warden or other official having custody of the 
prisoner, who shall forthwith: (1) Certify the term of commitment under which the 
prisoner is being held, the time already served on the sentence, the time remaining to 
be served, the good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any 
decisions of the state parole board relating to the prisoner; and (2) Send by registered 
or certified mail, return receipt requested, one copy of the request and certificate to the 
court and one copy to the prosecuting official to whom it is addressed. (emphasis add-
ed). 
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tution and Article I, section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution.229  The 
Chief Justice’s concurrence noted that the Court was unaware of the normal 
time that prisoners’ letters were usually mailed by the DOC, but that its 
failure to be “forthwith” may result in a deprivation of the prisoners’ 
rights.230  In the present case, however, the Chief Justice found the eleven-
day delay of receipt and dispatch of Gibson’s request was not enough to 
demonstrate that it was not mailed “forthwith” and therefore, did not de-
prive Gibson of his right to a speedy trial.231 
FAMILY LAW – CONTEMPT ORDERS – MAXIMUM LENGTH OF 
IMPRISONMENT 
Nygaard v. Taylor  
 
In Nygaard v. Taylor,232 Appellant, Trisha Taylor (“Taylor”), appealed 
a Cass County District Court order denying Taylor’s motion to quash con-
tempt orders and Taylor’s motion for her immediate release from incarcera-
tion.233  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that as a matter 
of first impression, Taylor could not be imprisoned longer than the statutory 
six-month limit, even though she continued to be in contempt of the court’s 
order.234  The district court found Taylor in contempt for violating multiple 
district court orders by refusing to return her minor children to their fathers, 
Aarion Nygaard (“Nygaard”) and Terance Stanley (“Stanley”).235  
In 2007, Taylor and Stanley became parents to a child, and two years 
later, in 2009, they married.236  In 2011, Taylor and Stanley divorced.237  
Although they never married, Taylor had a child with Nygaard in 2013.238  
Stanley and Nygaard had primary residential responsibility of their respec-
tive children, and Taylor had supervised visitation rights.239  Taylor, Stan-
ley, and Nygaard all resided in Fargo, North Dakota.240  Since September of 
2014, Stanley and Nygaard did not have contact with their children because 
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Taylor fled with both of the minor children to the Cheyenne River Indian 
Reservation in South Dakota.241  
The district court found Taylor in contempt for violating multiple dis-
trict court orders by refusing to return her minor children to their respective 
fathers.242  Taylor had been incarcerated in North Dakota since November 
of 2014, as she was arrested and pled guilty to parental kidnapping, a class 
C felony.243  In November of 2015, shortly before Taylor was to be released 
on parole, the District Court issued interlocutory orders in the two custody 
cases finding Taylor in contempt for refusing to return the children to their 
respective fathers.244  Upon Taylor’s release, she was arrested for con-
tempt.245  Taylor remained incarcerated until the North Dakota Supreme 
Court decided this case.246   
In January of 2016, the judicial referee disagreed with Taylor’s argu-
ment that she was unable to return her children to their respective fathers.247  
Specifically, the referee found Taylor was “voluntarily electing to continue 
to withhold” the minor children.248  In March of 2016, the judicial referee 
order confirmed the prior ruling, which ordered Taylor to “remain in custo-
dy until such time as she returns the minor child[ren] to” their respective 
fathers.249  Next, in April of 2016, the District Court adopted and affirmed 
the judicial referee’s orders, and Taylor did not appeal.250  Six months later, 
in October of 2016, Taylor filed motions to quash the contempt orders and 
moved to be immediately released from prison.251  Taylor argued that her 
imprisonment of over four hundred days for contempt exceeded the six- 
month limit imposed by N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.4(1)(b).252  Specifically, § 27-
10-01.4(1)(b), limits imprisonment as a remedial sanction for continuing 
contempts to “extend for as long as the contemnor continues the contempt 
or six months, whichever is shorter.”253  
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251. Nygaard, ¶ 5, 900 N.W.2d at 835. 
252. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE. § 27-10-01.4(1)(b) (2017) states:   
A court may impose one or more of the following remedial sanctions: (b) Imprison-
ment if the contempt of court is of a type included in subdivision b, c, d, e, or f of sub-
section 1 of section 27-10-01.4. The imprisonment may extend for as long as the con-
temnor continues the contempt or six months, whichever is shorter. 
253. Nygaard, ¶ 17, 900 N.W.2d at 838; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.4(1)(b) (2017). 
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In addressing Taylor’s appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court con-
ceptualized the issue as “whether Taylor is entitled to be released from con-
finement because she has served more than the six consecutive months in 
prison allowed under §27-10-01.4.”254  The Court explained that the issue 
was a question of first impression in this jurisdiction because the case in-
volved “a district court’s authority to incarcerate persons found to be in 
contempt of court indefinitely.”255  The Court considered the issue to be of 
“vital concern regarding matters of important public interest.”256 
The Court first looked to Wisconsin’s contempt system for guidance.257  
The Court looked at the similarity between North Dakota and Wisconsin 
contempt statutes, as well as, the Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Kenosha 
Unified School District No. 1 v. Kenosha Ed. Ass’n.258  Specifically, the 
Court explained that in addition to basing North Dakota contempt law on 
Wisconsin contempt law, the Wisconsin contempt statute § 785.04(1) is 
“substantially identical” to North Dakota’s § 27-10-01.4(1).259  The princi-
ples of Wisconsin’s contempt statute § 785.04(1) were clarified in the Ke-
noshsa case.260 
In Kenosha, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that a fine im-
posed against a contemnor could not exceed the statutory maximum of 
$250.261  With this analysis, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined 
that although courts, including the North Dakota Supreme Court, have rec-
ognized a courts’ inherent contempt powers, those powers may be limited 
by the legislature.262  The Court explained that such limitation exists in § 
27-10-01.4(1)(b).263  Specifically § 27-10-01.4(1)(b) limits imprisonment as 
a remedial sanction for continuing contempt to “extend for as long as the 
contemnor continues the contempt or six months, whichever is shorter.”264  
Next, the Court addressed Nygaard’s and Stanley’s reliance on subdivi-
sion (d) of § 27-10-01.4.265  Nygaard and Stanley argued that imprisonment 
 
254. Nygaard, ¶ 14, 900 N.W.2d at 837. 
255. Id. ¶ 12, 900 N.W.2d at 836. 
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257. Id. ¶ 15, 900 N.W.2d at 837. 
258. Id.; Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Kenosha Ed. Ass’n., 234 N.W.2d 311 
(1975). 
259. Nygaard, ¶ 15, 900 N.W.2d at 837; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 785.04(1) (West 2001). 
260. Nygaard, ¶ 15, 900 N.W.2d at 837. 
261. Id. ¶ 16. 
262. Id. ¶ 17, 900 N.W.2d at 838. 
263. Id. 
264. Id.  
265. Id. ¶ 18, 900 N.W.2d at 839; N.D. CENT. CODE. § 27-10-01.4(1)(d) (2017) (“A court 
may impose one or more of the following remedial sanctions: (d) An order designed to ensure 
compliance with a previous order of the court.”). 
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could be extended beyond six months if the sanction is “designed to ensure 
compliance with a previous order of the court.”266  The Supreme Court re-
jected this argument explaining “[t]o read subdivision (d) as allowing im-
prisonment beyond six months would render the specific limitations in sub-
division (b) superfluous.”267  
Lastly, the Court ruled out subdivision (e) as justifying Taylor’s im-
prisonment for over six months.268  The Supreme Court explained that sub-
division (e) does not permit imprisonment beyond six months.269  The legis-
lature has also taken into account that courts may exercise inherent 
authority beyond the six-month limitation for imprisonment “if the court 
expressly finds that [the six-month limitation] would be ineffectual to ter-
minate a continuing contempt.”270  However, the Court explained that nei-
ther the judicial referee orders nor any district court orders expressly found 
that imprisonment for six months under § 27-10-01.4(1)(b) would be inef-
fectual to terminate Taylor’s continuing contempt.271  Thus, the Court rea-
soned that without such express finding, Taylor could not be imprisoned for 
more than six months.272  
Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judi-
cial referee erred in denying Taylor’s motion of immediate release from in-
carceration.273 
FAMILY LAW – TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS EQUALS A 
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES – GRANDPARENT 
HAS NO RIGHT TO VISIT GRANDCHILDREN AFTER A 
FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS ARE TERMINATED 
Kulbacki v. Michael 
 
In Kulbacki v. Michael,274 Amanda Kulbacki (“Kulbacki”) appealed 
the Grand Forks County District Court’s judgment, which denied 
Kulbacki’s motion to terminate the visitation rights of her child’s paternal 
 
266. Nygaard, ¶ 17, 900 N.W.2d at 838; N.D. CENT CODE § 27-10-01.4(1)(d) (2017). 
267. Nygaard, ¶ 18, 900 N.W.2d at 839. 
268. Id. ¶ 19; N.D. CENT. CODE. § 27-10-01.4(1)(d) (2017) (“A court may impose one or 
more of the following remedial sanctions: (e) A sanction other than the sanctions specified in sub-
divisions a through d if the court expressly finds that those sanctions would be ineffectual to ter-
minate a continuing contempt.”) 
269. Nygaard, ¶ 19, 900 N.W.2d at 839. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. ¶ 20. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. ¶ 21.  
274. 2017 ND 184, 899 N.W.2d 643.  
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grandparents after the father’s parental rights were terminated.275  Kulbacki 
argued that the termination of the father’s parental rights resulted in a mate-
rial change in circumstances.276  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded part of the district court’s judgment.277  
In 2012, Amanda Kulbacki was pregnant when she divorced Nicholas 
Michael (“Michael”).278  Michael was incarcerated during the child’s 
birth.279 Michael and his mother, Shawn Coulter (“Coulter”), used § 14-09-
05.1280 of the North Dakota Century Code to request grandparent visitation 
after the child was born.281  Subsequently, Kulbacki started the process to 
terminate Michael’s parental rights in Maricopa County, Arizona because 
that is where she and the child resided.282 
Upon review, the district court in Grand Forks County held in Coulter’s 
favor.283  Thus, Coulter was awarded unsupervised visitation for one-half 
hour each day Kulbacki visited Grand Forks, North Dakota.284  The district 
court reasoned that Kulbacki failed to demonstrate that the child’s best in-
terests would be interfered with from limited grandparent visitation.285  
Kulbacki appealed that ruling to the North Dakota Supreme Court, which 
held the “district court improperly placed the burden on Kulbacki to show 
grandparent visitation was not in the child’s best interests.”286  As a result, 
the Court remanded the issue to the district court with the burden switched 
to Coulter to demonstrate visitation was in the child’s best interest and 
would not interfere with the parent-child relationship.287  
Upon remand, the district court again awarded Coulter a thirty-minute 
visitation with her grandchild for each day Kulbacki visited Grand Forks, 
 
275. Kulbacki, ¶ 1, 899 N.W.2d at 644. 
276. Id. ¶ 8, 899 N.W.2d at 646. 
277. Id. ¶ 18, 899 N.W.2d at 648. 
278. Id. ¶ 2, 899 N.W.2d at 645.  
279. Id.  
280. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1(1)-(2) (2017) states:  
The grandparents and great-grandparents of an unmarried minor child may be granted 
reasonable visitation rights to the child by the district court upon a finding that visita-
tion would be in the best interests of the child and would not interfere with the parent-
child relationship. The court shall consider the amount of personal contact that has oc-
curred between the grandparents or great-grandparents and the child and the child’s 
parents. 
281. Kulbacki, ¶ 2, 899 N.W.2d at 644-45. 
282. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 645. 
283. Id. ¶ 3. 
284. Id.  
285. Id.  
286. Id. (quoting Kulbacki v. Michael, 2014 ND 83, ¶ 10, 845 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 2014)). 
287. Kulbacki, ¶ 3, 899 N.W.2d at 645. 
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North Dakota.288  Specifically, the ruling was held in Coulter’s favor be-
cause the district court determined that Kulbacki had interfered with Coul-
ter’s attempts to have any type of contact with her grandchild.289 
After the district court issued its second holding, the Arizona Superior 
Court terminated Michael’s parental rights.290  As a result, Kulbacki moved 
to terminate the grandparent visitation order.291  Kulbacki argued that Coul-
ter had no relationship with the child.292  Specifically, Kulbacki stated that 
Coulter had not met the child and was not the child’s legal grandparent.293  
Additionally, Kulbacki moved the district court to remove Michael’s name 
from the child’s birth certificate.294  The district court ruled against 
Kulbacki because it found no material change in circumstances since the 
last ruling.295  As a result, Kulbacki appealed to the North Dakota Supreme 
Court.296 
First, in her appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Kulbacki ar-
gued that the district court erred in deciding a material change in circum-
stances did not occur since the district court’s second ruling.297  Kulbacki 
believed a material change in circumstances existed due to Michael’s paren-
tal rights being terminated.298  As a result of Michael’s terminated parental 
rights, Kulbacki argued that Coulter’s visitation rights should also be termi-
nated because she is not the child’s legal grandparent.299 
The Court used §14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code be-
cause it concerns a grandparent’s right to visit a minor grandchild.300  How-
ever, this section fails to address the modification of a grandparent’s visita-
tion with a minor grandchild.301 Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court had not addressed this issue prior to hearing this case.302 As a result, 
the Court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance and found that courts 
have analogized to the modification of parenting time when determining the 
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289. Id. 
290. Id. ¶ 5. 
291. Id.  
292. Id.  
293. Kulbacki, ¶ 5, 899 N.W.2d at 645; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2017). 
294. Kulbacki, ¶ 5, 899 N.W.2d at 645. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. ¶ 1, 899 N.W.2d at 644. 
297. Id. ¶ 6, 899 N.W.2d at 645. 
298. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 899 N.W.2d at 645, 646. 
299. Id. ¶ 6, 899 N.W.2d at 645. 
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modification of grandparent visitation.303 The Court relied on Bredeson v. 
Mackey304 and stated “[a] modification of parenting time requires material 
change in circumstances that has occurred since the prior order, and modifi-
cation of the order is necessary to serve the child’s best interests.”305 Ac-
cordingly, since the grandchild and Coulter have had no personal contact, 
the Court only needed to determine if a material change in circumstances 
had occurred.306 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that “the termination of a par-
ent’s rights is a material change in circumstances as a matter of law in a 
proceeding relating to the modification of grandparent visitation.”307  The 
Court reasoned, “a decree terminating parental rights severs all legal ties be-
tween the natural parent and the child.”308  Thus, the termination of Mi-
chael’s parental rights meant that Coulter was no longer the child’s legal 
grandparent.309 Consequently, the Court overturned the district court’s hold-
ing because a material change in circumstances had occurred.310 
Next, the Court determined if Coulter could use the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code’s § 14-09-05.1(2) to establish a visitation right with her grand-
child.311  Section 14-09-05.1 states “[t]he court shall consider the amount of 
personal contact that has occurred between the grandparents or great-
grandparents and the child and the child’s parents.312  Here the Court relied 
on Troxel v. Granville, which stated, “the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make deci-
sions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”313  In this 
case, Coulter had never met her grandchild, had no contact with her grand-
child, and Kulbacki did not want Coulter to have a relationship with her 
grandchild.314 Consequently, Coulter lacked personal contact with the 
grandchild, which meant Coulter could not use § 14-09-05.1 to establish a 
right to visit her grandchild.315  
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Lastly, the Court determined if the Grand Forks County District Court 
had jurisdiction to order the North Dakota Department of Vital Statistics to 
amend the child’s birth certificate to reflect Michael’s terminated parental 
rights.316  Kulbacki argued that the district court erred when it determined it 
did not have jurisdiction to amend the birth certificate.317  Kulbacki filed the 
Arizona order that terminated Michael’s parental rights in Grand Forks 
County.318  Section 28.20.1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code states 
that an order from another state filed under this section has “the same effect 
. . . as a judgment of a district court of any county of this state.”319  Thus, 
because the Arizona order was filed under § 28.20.1-02, the order became a 
North Dakota order.320  Accordingly, Michael’s parental rights were termi-
nated when Kulbacki filed the order in North Dakota.321 
Because Michaels’ parental rights were terminated, the Court held the 
district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction, meaning that it had au-
thority to determine the case.322  Sections 23-02.1-25(1) and (3) of the 
North Dakota Century Code provided the district court’s authority to amend 
a birth record if it follows governing statutes and regulations.323  Thus, the 
Court remanded the amendment of the birth certificate to the district 
court.324  Overall, the Court held that when a father loses his parental rights,  
his parents lose their right to visit the grandchild.325 
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GOVERNMENT - COUNTIES - INTERVENTION NEEDED BECAUSE 
OF GREAT PUBLIC INTEREST – COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
AUTHORITY TO FIRE LOCAL SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 
EMPLOYEES 
Schwartzenberger v. McKenzie County 
 
In Schwartzenberger v. McKenzie County,326 Gary Schwartzenberger 
(“Schwartzenberger “) appealed a district court judgment denying him a 
writ to prohibit the McKenzie County Board of County Commissioners 
(“Board”) from taking disciplinary action up to and including termination 
against a sheriff’s office deputy.327  The North Dakota Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the Board did not have the authority to discipline or 
terminate a sheriff’s office deputy.328 
In November 2014, Gary Schwartzenberger became the McKenzie 
County sheriff.329  In May of 2016, a sheriff’s office employee complained 
to the McKenzie County human resource director about bullying and retali-
ation that occurred within the sheriff’s office.330  The Board conducted an 
internal investigation of the sheriff’s office by contracting with the Village 
Business Institute.331  After the investigation results were received, the 
Board unanimously decided “‘to take disciplinary action against Lt. Mi-
chael Schmitz up to and including termination, pending a response within 
10 days, and a final determination by this board,’ and to place Lt. Schmitz 
‘on administrative leave immediately and unpaid administrative leave be-
ginning the October 16, 2016, payroll.’”332  Additionally, the Board asked 
the acting state’s attorney to prepare a motion for Schwartzenberger’s re-
moval by the governor.333 
In response, Schwartzenberger asked the district court to prohibit the 
Board from taking additional actions on its motions because he believed the 
Board surpassed its jurisdiction and acted unlawfully.334  The district court 
denied Schwartzenberger’s writ of prohibition petition.335  Specifically, the 
district court held that the Board had the power to investigate the sheriff’s 
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office and ask the state’s attorney to prepare a petition requesting the gov-
ernor’s removal of Sheriff Schwartzenberger.336  Furthermore, the district 
court held disciplinary action against Lt. Schmitz was within the Board’s 
authority.337 
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined whether the issue 
regarding authority to discipline and terminate employees was moot.338  The 
Board’s position was that this issue was moot because Lt. Schmitz had al-
ready been terminated for unrelated reasons.339  However, Schwartzen-
berger, acting in his official capacity as sheriff, claimed the issue was not 
moot because the Board surpassed its jurisdiction by meddling with the in-
ternal operations of the sheriff’s office.340  
The Court agreed with Schwartzenberger and held that the issue was 
not moot because it involved a great public interest in which intervention 
was needed between elected county commissioners and elected sheriffs.341  
Specifically, the Court reasoned that this issue was of great public interest 
because it involved public officials’ power and authority.342  The Court ex-
plained that this power and authority had the possibility of developing into 
a nonstop-cycle if it continued to evade review.343  Here, the Court deter-
mined that although Lt. Schmitz no longer worked for the sheriff’s office 
for unrelated reasons, this issue involving the Board’s scope of authority to 
discipline and terminate employees was not moot.344  The Court reasoned 
that the Board’s scope of authority was interrelated and overlapped with the 
elected sheriff’s authority.345 
Next, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined whether the Board 
had the authority to discipline employees from a local sheriff’s office.346  
Schwartzenberger argued that the disciplinary action taken by the Board, 
against his sheriff’s office, was beyond the Board’s authority.347  In re-
sponse, the Board argued that it had a duty to supervise county officers.348  
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The Court ruled in favor of Schwartzenberger and held that the Board had 
no authority to discipline or fire local sheriff’s office employees.349  
The Court used the North Dakota Century Code § 11-11-11(1) and (2) 
to determine that the Board had the “authority to superintend the fiscal af-
fairs of the county and to supervise the conduct of the respective county of-
ficers, including the sheriff.”350  Additionally, the Court used a North Dako-
ta Attorney General’s opinion as persuasive authority to reach its 
holding.351  The Attorney General’s opinion states that a board of county 
commissioners could not remove or restrict a county officer’s power to ter-
minate an employee hired by that officer.352  In interpreting the natural lan-
guage of the statue, the Attorney General’s opinion reasoned that since the 
county officer has the power to appoint or hire employees, the county of-
ficer also has the power to fire said employees.353  Thus, the Court held that 
the sheriff had the power to discipline his sheriff’s office employees.354  
Lastly, in holding that the Board lacked authority, the Court used per-
suasive authority from other jurisdictions that had similar statutes to deter-
mine powers of county boards and sheriffs.355  In Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. 
Neilander, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the board can implement 
personal policies for county employees, but the sheriff holds the power to 
discipline employees.356  Accordingly, the Court used the Neilander ruling 
as persuasive authority because it was consistent with the North Dakota At-
torney General’s opinion.357  As a result, the Court reversed the district 
court’s judgment and determined that the Board could not discipline or ter-
minate a deputy in the Sheriff’s office.358 
Hence, the sheriff, not the Board, has the authority to discipline and 
terminate sheriff’s office employees.359  The Court reversed the district 
court’s ruling because the district court misapplied the law in determining 
who has the authority to discipline and terminate sheriff’s office employ-
ees.360  As a result, that Court explained that Schwartzenberger should have 
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received a writ of prohibition, which would have prohibited the Board from 
having the power to terminate and discipline a sheriff’s office employee.361 
 
361. Id., 901 N.W.2d at 71-72. 
